By Girish Nikam

The dust is finally settling down. The game of alliances has assumed some discernible form at last. And what do we have? A different United Progressive Alliance (UPA) which is not really as it exists in the present Government. A National Democratic Alliance which looks pretty emaciated. A third front which is making a lot of noise without much substance. And a fourth front which seems to be suffering from an existential dilemma, of to be (with the UPA) or not to be!

At the centre of all this are two national parties, Congress and the BJP. BJP has lost significant allies, and may lose some more post-elections. So has Congress, though it has itself to blame for it. Interestingly however a section of the Congress leadership thinks it is not a loss but a strategic shift with an eye on the future. So has Congress really lost out badly as it looks on first glimpse, with recent allies like Samajawadi Party moving away and old allies like Lalu Yadav and Ram Vilas Paswan also not with the Congress and PMK in Tamil Nadu abandoning the alliance?

Whose losses of allies are more significant in the context of the Lok Sabha elections, BJP�s or Congress�? Who will it hurt more? The answers to these questions will give us some clarity in the maze of comings and goings one has witnessed in these past few weeks, in the run up to the five-phase polls.

Now let�s take the BJP first. They have lost two significant allies, with whom they had an alliance in 2004. While Mamta Banerjee had moved out of the NDA earlier, it would have been really beneficial for the BJP if they had hung on to her. In the present atmosphere in West Bengal where the left parties, even by their own admission, are losing ground, it would have been a golden opportunity for the BJP to have an ally like Mamta to gain some seats. However without her, and with the Congress-Mamta alliance sealed, the BJP stands to lose out.

Its greater loss however is the Biju Janata Dal walking out of the 11-year old alliance. The enormity of this loss is clearly evident in the numbers. In 1999, the alliance between the two parties, BJD and BJP in the Lok Sabha elections had resulted in a virtual sweep for the combine. BJP winning, all the nine seats it contested and BJD winning 10 out of 12. In 2004 also the results were very impressive, with BJP winning 7 out of 9 and BJD 11 out of 12. BJP is now left staring at a possible wipe out in a triangular contest in the State now.

Meanwhile, though it has managed to hold on to its alliance with the Janata Dal (U) in Bihar, the strain is showing. It has had to yield one more seat than in 2004 and is now contesting only 15 of the 40 seats. Speculations about which way the JD(U) will head in the post-election scenario is not good news for the BJP.

Of course it has made some gains in Assam, by finalizing a tie-up with the Asom Gana Parishad, with which it had been estranged in 2004. With the BJP now contesting 8 out of the 14 seats, it is likely to gain, but those gains are unlikely to make up for the losses in Orissa. The remaining two allies, Shiv Sena and Shiromani Akali Dal, however continue to stick to the BJP, though in both Maharashtra and Punjab, the prospects certainly don�t look brighter than in 2004.

On the other hand, where does the Congress stand? A lot is being written and commented about the attitude of the Congress which has rejected the idea of fighting as UPA nationally, and instead falling back on state-wise alliances.

Unlike the BJP, Congress has a different approach to alliances. Having been a truly national party with its spread in every nook and corner of the country once upon a time, it continues to nurse hopes of regaining that truly national base. Whereas BJP is only now trying to acquire a pan-Indian presence, and therefore is more amenable to alliances, though it has not succeeded in adding any new allies since 1999.

For the Congress, its present allies were rivals in the past and can become one as well as in the future. No wonder it tends to take its allies with a pinch of salt. It still suffers from the Pachmarhi syndrome, where in 1999 it had declared that it would strive to re-emerge again as the single biggest pan Indian party. Though in Shimla in 2003 it modified its approach and opened its door for alliances. Despite its five year successful stint now running an alliance government, the discomfort it feels and the nostalgia about its pan Indian presence, has made it decide to reject a joint fight across the country with its UPA allies.

Is it a suicidal decision or a risk worth taking? In fact, when Congress emerged as the single largest party in 2004 with 145 seats, it had done exactly what it has done now, except in Bihar. It only had a Maharashtra-Goa specific alliance with NCP, Bihar specific alliance with RJD-LJSP, with DMK-PMK-MDMK combine in Tamil Nadu and with the JMM in Jharkhand. In all other States it had gone on its own.

Now it has decided to go on its own in Bihar too. And why not? For years the Congress cadres in Bihar or whatever is left of it, as well as those with nostalgic acquaintance with the party have been pleading for going it alone. And now by doing it, Congress has taken a worthwhile risk. At worst it will lose three of the seats it had won in 2004, and at best it will revive its cadres and also may have the option of wooing the Janata Dal(U) in a post-election scenario if it comes with better numbers than the RJD-LJSP combine.

Similarly in Uttar Pradesh, Congress which had won nine seats without any alliance in 2004, is again taking a calculated risk, which at worst may result in losing a couple of seats, while it also gains confidence for the local cadres, and also keeping the option open for a tie-up with either the SP or the BSP in a post-election scenario.

It is only in Tamil Nadu, despite DMK still solidly behind it, Congress� calculations has not really worked, as the PMK, which it wanted to hold on to, moving away and actor Vijay Kant�s DMDK refusing to be its ally. However, knowing the propensity of the Tamil Nadu parties� for their post-election somersaults, Congress can still hope to rope in one of these parties or even more than one, if it emerges as the single largest party, which seems more likely.

The Congress in fact, by adopting this selective alliance approach, has in fact kept its options open to choose from a variety of fare on offer in the post-election scenario across the country, and it may just turn out to be a smart thing for it to have done. A risk certainly worth taking. If it is Rahul Gandhi who is the architect of this strategy, as we are made to believe, he will take the credit for its success as well as the stick if it fails.